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COMMENT
HOLDING THE ―RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER‖ RESPONSIBLE:
ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR
EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
VIOLATORS
I.

INTRODUCTION

As custodians of the planet, we are bound by a duty to protect the
environment for all living creatures. Ensuring ecosystems function
harmoniously is of utmost importance in order to sustain the health of the
Earth and all living organisms residing on and in its fertile soils and rich
waters. Since the expansion of business during the Industrial Revolution,
companies of all sizes have been impacting our environment, leaving
cumulative footprints of destruction in their paths.1 This impact has been
devastating, and without proper regulation this trend will continue with
dire consequences.2
1

See Encyclopædia Britanica Online, Industrial Revolution, www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/287086/Industrial-Revolution (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). The Industrial
Revolution began in Europe in the eighteenth century, and was characterized by ―unprecedented
economic development‖ and a ―general expansion of commercial activity.‖ Id.; see also N. Brian
Winchester, Emerging Global Environmental Governance, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 7, 8 (2009)
(―The Industrial Revolution was similarly characterized by contaminated water, poisonous air, and
deadly epidemics that were undoubtedly responsible for the premature death of thousands of
people.‖).
2
See, e.g., Species Disappearing at an Alarming Rate, Report Says, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 17,
2004, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6502368/ (reporting that the ―world‘s biodiversity is declining at an
unprecedented rate . . . [with] [h]abitat destruction and degradation [being] the leading threats.‖); see
also U.S. EPA, Climate Change – Greenhouse Gas Emissions, www.epa.gov/climatechange/

395

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

1

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 5
05_MULLIKIN PRINTER VERSION

396

5/22/2010 11:51 AM

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 3

Criminal prosecution of environmental crimes has played a key role
in enforcing compulsory regulations that govern the corporate private
sector.3 Criminal sanctions in the corporate arena are essential to deter
and remediate environmental crimes and ensure protection of the public.4
Imposing civil liability on a corporation is insufficient, as the true
violators may hide behind the corporation and avoid personal liability.5
Through litigation, a doctrine has been developed that is used to expand
criminal liability beyond the corporation to include ―responsible
corporate officers.‖6 Subsequently, this doctrine has been written into
various environmental statutes,7 but application of this doctrine has been
met with varying resistance because of its ability to ―pierce the corporate
veil.‖8 Over time the courts narrowed the scope of this doctrine.9

emissions/co2.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) ―Since the Industrial Revolution in the 1700‘s, human
activities, such as the burning of oil, coal and gas, and deforestation, have increased CO2
concentrations in the atmosphere. In 2005, global atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were 35%
higher than they were before the Industrial Revolution.‖).
3
See Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes,
21 ST. MARY‘S L.J. 821, 822 (1990) (―[Government] agencies now feel that the mere imposition of
fines is largely ineffective; thus resulting in the onset of criminal sanctions. The threat of possible
incarceration for violations of environmental statutes has terrorized many environmental managers
and commanded their previously unattainable respect.‖).
4
See Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 506 (1996-97) (noting that
criminalization of environmental violations is rooted in the core concepts of criminal law, including
deterrence, harm, and culpability); see also Ethan H. Jessup, Environmental Crimes and Corporate
Liability: The Evolution of the Prosecution of “Green” Crimes by Corporate Entities, 33 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 721, 730 (1999) (―One of the main purposes and policies behind any criminal prosecution is
deterring criminals and would-be criminals from committing crimes.‖).
5
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, corporate veil (8th ed. 2004) (―The legal assumption that
the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt
from liability for the corporation‘s actions.‖).
6
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658
(1975); see also Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine or
“Responsible Relationship” of Corporate Officer to Corporate Violation of Law , 119 A.L.R. 5th
205 (2004) (discussing case application of the responsible corporate officer doctrine, or on the basis
of a determination that there was a ―responsible relationship‖ of a corporate officer to a corporate
violation of law, or a ―responsible share‖ in such a violation, as derived from the doctrine first
enunciated in Dotterweich, and later in Park).
7
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(6)(Westlaw 2010) (―For the purpose of this subsection, the
term ‗person‘ means, in addition to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any
responsible corporate officer.‖); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6)(Westlaw 2010) (―For the purpose of this
subsection, the term ‗person‘ includes, in addition to the entities referred to in section 7602(e) of this
title, any responsible corporate officer.‖).
8
See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 446
(2007). (―[The Dotterweich and Park] decisions are credited with introducing the so-called
‗responsible corporate officer‘ (‗RCO‘) doctrine, which continues to generate substantial confusion
and uncertainty concerning the extent to which corporate officers are strictly liable for corporate
misconduct.‖); Jeremy D. Heep, Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of
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Congress specifically added ―responsible corporate officers‖ to the
list of those criminally liable under the Clean Water Act (CWA)10 and
the Clean Air Act (CAA).11 This comment argues that the responsible
corporate officer (RCO) doctrine, as written into the CWA and the CAA,
was intended to impose an affirmative duty on corporate officers based
on their position and should be interpreted to expand criminal liability in
the prosecution of substantive corporate environmental crimes.
This comment also argues that the courts should expand criminal
liability based on the RCO doctrine instead of limiting its application.
Part II provides an overview of criminal prosecution of environmental
crimes: its history, procedures, and purposes, in order to provide a
context for understanding how the RCO doctrine appropriately expands
criminal liability. Part III outlines the development of the RCO doctrine
by the Supreme Court and its addition to the CWA and the CAA.
Although the RCO doctrine has been expanded to impose civil liability,
this comment focuses on its application to impose criminal liability only.
Part IV shows how some of the early judicial applications of the RCO
doctrine left it open for later courts to use the doctrine to expand criminal
liability of corporate officers. The clearest example of this argument for
expansion was articulated by the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Brittain.12 At the same time as Brittain, other circuits chose to limit
liability instead of expanding it; these contemporaneous decisions are
discussed in Part V. Part VI shows how subsequent courts chose to
affirm the limited interpretation rather than Brittain’s expanded one.
Lastly, Part VII examines other legal doctrines that extend criminal
liability. This comment concludes by arguing that the effectiveness of
environmental laws would be maximized by the application of the RCO
doctrine to expand criminal liability.

United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 78 MINN. L. REV. 699, 700 (1994) (noting
that ―the scope and breadth of the [responsible corporate officer] doctrine remains ambiguous‖).
9
See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.
1991) (finding that proof that the defendant was a responsible corporate officer was insufficient to
show required knowledge for conviction under RCRA); United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (rejecting the proposition that a corporate officer may be held criminally liable
for RCRA violations based solely on the officer‘s responsible position.); United States v. Iverson,
162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the doctrine relieves the government only of having to
prove that defendant personally discharged or caused the discharge of a pollutant; the government
still had to prove that the discharges violated the law and that defendant knew that the discharges
were pollutants).
10
See 33 U.S.C.A.§ 1319(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010).
11
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010).
12
United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES

There are two broad categories of offenses that can result in
criminal prosecution of environmental crimes. The first category is
covered under Title 18 of the United States Code, which punishes
conspiracies, the making of false statements, mail and wire fraud, and
other similar crimes.13 These types of crimes are outside the scope of this
comment. The second category involves acts made punishable
specifically under the various environmental statutes enacted since 1970
such as the CWA and the CAA,14 which will be the focus of this
comment.
A.

HISTORY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES

Federal environmental laws that incorporate criminal sanctions can
be traced back over one hundred years to the Rivers and Harbors Act
(RHA) of 1899.15 The RHA formed the basis for the CWA, which was
designed to ―restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation‘s waters.‖16 Under the CWA, violators were
originally subject mostly to civil and administrative penalties.17
However, during the 1980‘s the federal government increased the
penalties to include criminal enforcement.18 To support this increase, the
Department of Justice‘s (DOJ) Lands Division was reorganized to form
the Environmental Enforcement Section.19 The publicly stated goal of
this reorganization was to focus on ―egregious violations‖ and
―deliberate or recalcitrant violations‖ to enhance criminal enforcement of
environmental crimes.20 In January 1981 the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) created the Office of Criminal Enforcement to aid in this
enforcement.21

13
14

18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw 2010).
See DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 6.02

(2008).
15
Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified as amended in 33 U.S.C.A. § 401, et seq.
(Westlaw 2010)).
16
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2010).
17
See Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 893-94 (1991).
18
See id. at 894 (discussing the increase in penalties from civil to include criminal as a
reflection of society‘s changing opinion as to the violation of environmental regulations).
19
See Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental
Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 904 (1990).
20
See id. at 904 (discussing DOJ‘s attempt to shift to a new enforcement approach).
21
See id. at 907.
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In November 1982 the DOJ established the Environmental Crimes
Unit (ECU) to manage the criminal cases being filed by the EPA.22 ―The
creation of ECU served to provide DOJ with a team of prosecutors who
could concentrate exclusively on environmental criminal cases while
informing the public of DOJ‘s commitment to criminal prosecution of
environmental crimes.‖23 The ECU was very successful, filing forty
cases in the first year and achieving forty convictions.24
During this time period, Congress was increasing the complexity of
the regulatory regime and raising many violations from misdemeanors to
felonies.25 This increased enforcement was especially necessary in the
corporate arena. The theory was, and still is, that without criminal
sanctions that can include heavy fines and the occasional imprisonment
of corporate officers, corporations would continue to treat environmental
violations as a ―cost of doing business.‖26
B.

PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES

The criminal enforcement of environmental crimes begins at the
EPA and flows through to the DOJ.27 Administrators at the EPA are
authorized to respond to violations through administrative or civil
sanctions.28 In order to obtain criminal sanctions they must refer the case
22

See JUDSON W. STARR & YVETTE D. WILLIAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES IN
PERSPECTIVE, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 1, 5 (Nov. 8-9, 2001).
23
Id.
24
See Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, paralegal, to Ronald A. Sarachan, thenEnvironmental Crimes Section Chief, Department of Justice (Apr. 7, 1995), reproduced in JOHN F.
COONEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES DESKBOOK 87
(1996), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=-fWD7LptUiwC&lpg=PP1&dq=
environmental%20crimes%20deskbook&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false; see also Starr &
Williams, supra note 22, at 5.
25
See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2446-47 (1995)
(discussing how Congress significantly enhanced the penalties applicable to existing environmental
criminal provisions, upgrading many violations from misdemeanors to felonies).
26
See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 922 (2001) (discussing the idea
that if polluters are rational, the availability of criminal penalties is crucial to deterrence because
sometimes the economic benefit of noncompliance will exceed the maximum allowable civil penalty
under the statute); see also Paul Thomson, A New Cost of Business for Environmental Violators,
ENVTL. FORUM, May-June 1990, at 32 (―Jail time is one cost of doing business that cannot be passed
along to the consumer.‖); see also E. Dennis Muchnicki, Only Criminal Sanctions Can Ensure
Public Safety, ENVTL. FORUM, May-June 1990, at 31 (arguing that ―fines become merely a cost of
doing business,‖ and that only the threat of jail can deter some environmental crime).
27
See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 659
(2002).
28
See id.
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to the DOJ.29 At the DOJ, the prosecutors have discretion in deciding
whether to file charges for a violation and what sanctions should be
sought.30 Further, both EPA and DOJ can exercise their discretion not to
file charges for violations altogether.31 This includes discretion to decide
―(1) which crimes to prosecute and against which groups or individuals;
(2) when to investigate; (3) whether to charge; (4) whether to divert the
potential defendant from the criminal system to civil proceedings; and
(5) whether to plea bargain or dismiss charges.‖32
Critics of environmental prosecutions feel that prosecutorial
discretion creates problems with the fairness and predictability of
environmental criminal enforcement.33 One commentator argued that
prosecutorial discretion ―often results in an ―eeny meeny miny mo‖
element of prosecutorial choice in the environmental crimes arena and
imposes an almost arbitrary randomness and the appearance of
unfairness.‖34 The concern is that prosecutorial discretion could be used
as a means of ―widening the net‖ of criminal- enforcement efforts
beyond that intended by congressional statutes.35 But, like other branches
of statutory law, much of federal criminal law is flawed by imperfect
draftsmanship.36 This creates the need for flexibility, which is exactly
what prosecutorial discretion does to ensure appropriate enforcement
decisions. In fact, it is a necessary method for screening cases and
limiting the number of cases that are actually prosecuted to those that
actually deserve to be.37

29

42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(a)(3)(D) (Westlaw 2010).
See Krug, supra note 27, at 645.
31
See JOHN F. COONEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
DESKBOOK 8 (1996), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=-fWD7LptUiwC&lpg=PP1&
dq=environmental%20crimes%20deskbook&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false.
32
Theodora Galacatos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes
Section: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 599 (1995).
33
See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion,
and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116 (1998).
34
Milo C. Mason & Paul B. Smyth, Reviewing Nonreviewable Prosecutorial Discretion:
What and Who is Behind the Big, Powerful Curtain, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T 7, 31-32 (2009).
35
Brickey, supra note 33, at 129.
36
Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV., 1036, 1073 (1972) (criminal statutes tend to be written
at ―a level of generality that would make literal enforcement unjust‖).
37
See Brickey, supra note 33, at 129.
30
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PURPOSES OF THE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS

Criminal prosecution of environmental crimes is the appropriate
response to environmental violations, especially in the corporate context.
Criminal prosecution offers a wide range of advantages that traditional
civil sanctions do not, such as deterrence, remediation, and increased
public safety.38 Deterrence is essential to the effectiveness of
environmental enforcement because many of the effects of
environmental crimes are irreversible.39 Criminal prosecution is also
fitting for environmental violations because the remediation process
offered by criminal sanctions is more effective in its timeliness.40
Further, for reasons of public safety, criminal prosecution is a necessary
response to environmental crimes due to the potential for widespread
harm.41
i.

Deterrence

One of the main purposes of criminal prosecution is to deter
potential violators from committing crimes. In fact, criminal sanctions
are considered the most effective means of deterrence available because
of the power criminal courts have to impose severe penalties, such as jail
time.42 Because of the potential for businesses to write off the civil
penalties imposed for violations of environmental regulations as a cost of
doing business, the use of criminal sanctions for violations of
environmental laws reflects society‘s unwillingness to tolerate
environmental mistreatment. It also reflects society‘s desire to make sure
that businesses do not just pass on the civil costs of violations to the
consuming public.43 In addition to preventing businesses from taking this
view, the threat of criminal sanctions creates a strong personal incentive
for corporate officers to comply with the law to avoid criminal
38

See Jessup, supra note 4, at 730.
See Brickey, supra note 4, at 507 (discussing common traits of environmental crime and
traditional crime, noting that ―[e]nvironmental crimes have the potential to cause catastrophic harm
to the environment, public health, and local economies and ways of life‖).
40
See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731.
41
See id. (―[A]ny threat or potential threat to that safety are reasons for prosecuting
environmental crimes.‖).
42
See Brickey, supra note 4, at 506 (describing the ―social group‖ that corporate officials
belong to as being susceptible to coercion based on the threat of jail time due to the stigma that it
carries).
43
See Jessup, supra note 4, at 730; see also Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts
Environmental Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994).
39
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punishments.44 Normally corporate officers and employees are shielded
from personal liability by the corporate entity.45 Therefore, criminal
sanctions are an effective means of deterrence because in criminal law,
corporate officers are not protected from liability.46
ii.

Remediation

Environmental crimes can create problems that require expedited
remediation in order to limit the extent of the harm. 47 Criminal
prosecutions often move more quickly than civil and administrative
actions and are therefore a more effective means of remediation.48 This is
important in situations where a quick response to environmental crimes
is needed, whether it is clean-up or the prevention of future violations.
Another important aspect of remediation is society‘s need for vindication
through the punishment of a violator.49 Criminal prosecution of
environmental crimes is necessary to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for environmental laws, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.50
iii. Public Safety
Protection of the public follows along the same lines as deterrence
and remediation. Criminal sanctions, such as incarceration, are critical in
protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant.51 With the
44

See Brickey, supra note 4, at 506; see also Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts
Environmental Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994) (―Imposition of personal
criminal liability on corporate officers and employees . . . is seen as one way of ensuring that
businesses will take their environmental obligations seriously.‖).
45
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, corporate veil (8th ed. 2004) (―The legal assumption that
the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt
from liability for the corporation‘s actions‖); see also 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 48 (2009).
46
See Brickey, supra note 4, at 506.
47
See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731 (―The need to expedite remediation of an environmental
problem is an important consideration, as the protection of human health and the environment is a
central goal of criminal environmental enforcement.‖); see also Levin, supra note 44, at 51.
48
See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731 (―The ‗criminal justice system frequently moves more
quickly than civil litigation or even administrative action.‘‖) (quoting Martin E. Levin, The
Massachusetts Environmental Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994)).
49
See Jessup, supra note 4, at 730-31 (―[W]here the environmental violation results in such
harm to an individual, the public or the environment that society demands punishment, the case
likely will be prosecuted criminally.‖) (quoting Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts Environmental
Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994)).
50
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2010) (listing seriousness of the offense, respect
for environmental laws, and just punishment as factors to be considered in imposing a sentence).
51
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (Westlaw 2010) (listing the need to protect public from
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public‘s heath and safety as a central concern for many public agencies,
any threat to safety creates a strong incentive for prosecuting
environmental crimes.52 ―Where . . . conduct . . . has been particularly
egregious or repetitive, showing a total disregard for public health and
safety, it may be necessary to impose incarceration . . . simply to protect
the public.‖53
III. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER (RCO) DOCTRINE
The RCO doctrine has been discussed in United States Supreme
Court cases as well as written into multiple environmental-law statutes.
A.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

The RCO doctrine was originally articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Dotterweich in 1943.54 The RCO
doctrine was revisited and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Park in 1975.55 The RCO doctrine was also addressed
in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. a few years
prior to United States v. Park.56
i.

United States v. Dotterweich

The RCO doctrine is considered to have originated in United States
v. Dotterweich.57 Dotterweich, the president of Buffalo Pharmacal, Inc.,
was convicted for adulterated or misbranded food under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) when the company purchased,
repacked under its own label (misbranded), and shipped drugs in
interstate commerce, which is a violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a).58 At
the same time that Dotterweich was found guilty, the company of which
Dotterweich was the president was found not guilty.59 The FDCA
prohibited ―the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate

further violations as a factor to be considered in imposing a sentence).
52
See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731.
53
Jessup, supra note 4, at 731 (quoting Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts Environmental
Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994)).
54
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
55
See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
56
See United States v. Int‘l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
57
320 U.S. 277 (1943).
58
Id. at 278.
59
Id.
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commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded.‖60
Further, the Act provided that ―any person‖ violating this provision was
guilty of a misdemeanor.61 Dotterweich appealed the conviction by
claiming that since the company had already been charged, he could not
also be charged for the same crime.62 The Supreme Court held that ―[t]he
offense is committed, unless the enterprise which they are serving enjoys
the immunity of a guaranty, by all who do have such a responsible share
in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws . . . .‖63
This reasoning created the original foundation for the RCO doctrine,
which alleviated the need to prove independent criminal liability of a
corporate officer. Under the reasoning of the RCO doctrine, a corporate
officer could now share criminal liability based upon his or her position
in the corporation, and his or her ability to prevent violations of the
law.64
The Supreme Court justified holding an RCO liable for the crime of
the corporation.65 The Court stated, ―Congress has preferred to place
[criminal liability] upon those who have at least the opportunity of
informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the
protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to
throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.‖66 The
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Dotterweich follows the rationale of
imposing criminal liability on RCOs based on their positions.
ii.

United States v. Park

Almost thirty years after Dotterweich, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Park67 and reaffirmed the Court‘s decision to apply
criminal liability to RCOs. In Park, the Court quoted Dotterweich,

60

21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a) (Westlaw 2010).
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(a).
62
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (stating that, ―individuals are immune when the ‗person‘
who violates s 301(a) is a corporation . . . .‖).
63
Id. at 284; see also Cynthia H. Finn, The Responsible Corporate Officer, Criminal
Liability, and Mens Rea: Limitations on the RCO Doctrine, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 543, 551 (1996).
64
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (refusing to define what class of employees would stand in
responsible relation or who had a responsible share, but rather leaving it to the ―good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries‖).
65
See id. at 281 (stating that ―in the interest of the larger good, it puts the burden of acting at
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent, but standing in responsible relation to a public danger‖);
see also Karen M. Hansen, “Knowing” Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 987,
998-99 (1990).
66
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285; see also Finn, supra note 63, at 551.
67
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
61
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saying: ―[t]he [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act is of a now
familiar type which dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct—, awareness of some wrongdoing.‖68 The Court went
on to say that ―the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to
implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.‖69 The
Supreme Court validated the FDCA‘s decision to extend the imposition
of liability to corporate officers. In fact, the Court further stated that ―the
requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they
are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who
voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises . . . .‖70
The Supreme Court stands behind the imposition of criminal liability
based on a corporate officer‘s position.
Unfortunately, the policy of holding corporate officers criminally
liable based on their position was created and affirmed by the Supreme
Court in cases involving violations of the FDCA,71 which contains no
mens rea72 requirement.73 Therefore, Dotterweich and Park dealt with
violations that would be considered strict liability crimes.74 The courts
have been hesitant to extend criminal liability in the context of statutes
with a mens rea element because the original application of the RCO
doctrine did not require proving mens rea.75 This has led to uncertainty
and mixed results as to the use of RCO liability to secure a conviction in
later court decisions.
iii. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.
The Supreme Court opened the door for an expanded use of the
RCO doctrine in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp.76 In a government appeal of a dismissed information charging the
68

Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
69
Id. at 672; see also Hansen, supra note 65, at 1000.
70
Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
71
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see also Park, 421 U.S. 658.
72
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, mens rea (8th ed. 2004) (―The state of mind that the
prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime;
criminal intent or recklessness.‖).
73
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333 (Westlaw 2010); see also Finn, supra note 63, at 551.
74
See Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
75
See Parts V and VI below, discussing how later courts refused to extend liability without
proof of actual knowledge in environmental crimes that have a mens rea requirement.
76
United States v. Int‘l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
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defendant with violating ICC regulations, the Supreme Court determined
the word ―knowingly‖ applied only to knowledge of the facts, not
knowledge of the applicable regulation or a violation of the regulation.77
In this case, the defendant was charged with shipping sulfuric and
hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate commerce and knowingly failing to
indicate on the requisite papers that they were corrosive liquids, in
violation of regulations.78 The Court opined that when dangerous
products are involved, ―the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.‖79 The Court
justified its holding reasoning by referencing the principle of criminal
law that, ―ignorance of the law is no excuse.‖80 The Supreme Court thus
reiterated its conclusion that it is proper to impose criminal liability upon
those in a responsible position to ensure compliance with the law.
B.

STATUTORY HISTORY

The CAA and the CWA both include language holding ―responsible
corporate officers‖ individually liable.81 This comment argues that this
addition to the Acts reflects a congressional intent to impose criminal
liability on those persons who hold responsible positions in corporate
violations.
i.

The CAA

In 1955, Congress enacted the Air Pollution Control Act as the first
federal statute dealing with air quality and air pollution, providing funds
for research.82 The Clean Air Act of 1970 was the first federal legislation
regarding air pollution control, authorizing the development of
comprehensive federal and state regulations limiting emissions.83 Later
amendments increased regulation; under Section 113(c) of the 1977
CAA, the EPA administrator was authorized to bring actions resulting in
77

See id. at 563-64; see also, Hansen, supra note 65, at 1008.
Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559.
79
Id. at 565.
80
Id.; see also Barbara DiTata, Proof of Knowledge Under RCRA and Use of the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 795, 805 (1996) (describing the theory of Int’l
Minerals as imposing a ―presumption of awareness of regulation‖).
81
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6)(Westlaw 2010); see 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(6)(Westlaw
2010).
82
United States Environmental Protection Agency, History of the Clean Air Act (2008),
www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa_history.html.
83
Id.
78
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either fines, confinement, or both, when specific sections of the CAA
were knowingly violated.84 Thus, under the 1977 CAA, criminal liability
could be imposed under subsection 113(c)(1) for just having knowledge
of the violations.85 The 1990 CAA Amendments increased the criminalenforcement options of environmental laws. The criminal-enforcement
provisions of the amended CAA are still contained in Section 113(c),
which now mandates a fine, or imprisonment for up to five years, or
both.86 Under subsection (c)(1) criminal liability may be imposed for
knowing violations of CAA regulations.87 Furthermore, under Section
113(c)(2) of the CAA, criminal liability with a fine and a maximum twoyear prison sentence may be imposed for (1) knowingly making any false
statement, representation, or certification in a document filed or required
to be maintained under the CAA; (2) falsifying, tampering with, or
knowingly rendering inaccurate any monitoring device or method
required to be maintained; or (3) knowingly failing to make reports that
are required.88 Also, the fines and prison sentences can be doubled in the
event of a second conviction of any of these offenses.89
ii.

The CWA

Two years after enacting the CAA in 1970, Congress amended the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly called the Clean Water
Act.90 The CWA of 1972 provided misdemeanor penalties of up to one
year of imprisonment and a $25,000 fine for the willful or negligent
violation of requirements imposed by or under the CWA,91 or of the
conditions or limitations in a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit issued by the EPA Administrator or, a state, or
in a Section 404 permit.92 The same violation was made a felony if
committed after a first conviction.93 The 1972 statute also established
misdemeanor penalties of up to six months of imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine for knowingly falsifying records and for tampering with
84

42 U.S.C.A §§ 7413(c)(1)(1977) amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (1990); see also Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 282 (1978).
85
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1).
86
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1) (person convicted of violation ―shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine pursuant to Title 18, or by imprisonment for not to exceed 5 years, or both‖).
87
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1).
88
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(2).
89
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1),(2).
90
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (Westlaw 2010).
91
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1).
92
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(B).
93
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1).
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monitoring devices required to be maintained under the CWA.94
The CWA was amended in 1987, increasing criminal penalty
provisions.95 A violator may now be liable for misdemeanor penalties of
up to one year of imprisonment and a $25,000-per-day fine for the
negligent violation of any of eight specific sections of the statute,96 of
requirements imposed by permits issued under the Section 402 NPDES
program, or of the Section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program, or for the
contamination of sewer systems and publicly owned treatment works.97
Further, the amendments distinguished between negligent violations,
which are punished as misdemeanors, and knowing violations, which are
punished as felonies.98 These increased penalty provisions are essential
to the enforcement capabilities of the EPA.
iii. Statutory Inclusion of the RCO Doctrine
The 1990 Amendments to the CAA also added the ―responsible
corporate officer‖ provision to the definition of ―person‖ for purposes of
criminal penalties.99 This provision is similar to the CWA addition in the
1977 Amendments.100 With the 1977 enactment and in the 1990
Amendments to the CAA, Congress failed to explain the addition of the
RCO provisions.101 The only legislative reference concerning the
addition of the RCO provision in the 1977 amendment to the CAA is
made in a report from the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, which states as follows:
For the purpose of liability for criminal penalties the term ―person‖ is
defined to include any responsible corporate officer. This is based on a
similar definition in the enforcement section of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. The Committee intends that criminal penalties
be sought against those corporate officers under whose responsibility a
violation has taken place, and not just those employees directly

94

33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(2).
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1972) amended by 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(1987).
96
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1).
97
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(B).
98
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c).
99
42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010).
100
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319.
101
See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (―Section 1319(c)(3)
does not define a ‗responsible corporate officer‘ and the legislative history is silent regarding
Congress‘s intention in adding the term. However, the Supreme Court first recognized the concept of
‗responsible corporate officer‘ in 1943.‖).
95
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102

The change intended by these amendments is unclear. Long before
the addition of the RCO provisions by these amendments, the Supreme
Court held that a corporate official was in fact a ―person‖ subject to
liability under the FDCA.103 With this in mind, the legislative
amendments to include RCOs in the definition of ―person‖ would not
have been necessary to convict corporate officers, indicating Congress
intended a more significant change when adding ―responsible corporate
officers‖ as potentially liable parties under the CWA and CAA.104
The CWA and CAA require the government to show that a
defendant had ―knowledge‖ of the violation to satisfy the mens rea of the
felony.105 However, the RCO doctrine has been used to impose criminal
liability without regard to the state of mind of the defendant.106 The
Tenth Circuit addressed this discrepancy in the mental state required for
conviction under the CWA:
We interpret the addition of ―responsible corporate officers‖ as an
expansion of liability under the Act rather than, as defendant would
have it, an implicit limitation. The plain language of the statute, after
all, states that ―responsible corporate officers‖ are liable ―in addition
107
to the definition [of persons] contained in section 1362(5) . . . .‖

The logical interpretation of the addition of the RCO provisions to
these statutes would indicate that by incorporating the doctrine into the
CWA and CAA, Congress intended to expand criminal liability.108 This
102
Brenda S. Hustis & John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated
Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 169, 183-84 (1994) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-717, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1976)).
103
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).
104
Hustis & Gotanda, supra note 102, at 183-84; see also, Joseph J. Lisa, Negligence-Based
Environmental Crimes: Failing To Exercise Due Care Can Be Criminal, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9
(2007) (arguing that the RCO doctrine imposes criminal sanctions against corporate officers
regardless of their participation in violating a public-welfare statute as long as they are in a position
of power to prevent or correct the violation and failed to do so).
105
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(2) (Westlaw 2010) (allowing for imprisonment for greater than
one year for knowing violations); & 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1) (Westlaw 2010) (same); see also 18
U.S.C.A. 3559(a) (Westlaw 2010) (distinguishing a misdemeanor from felony by the term of
imprisonment for a felony as one year or greater).
106
See Hustis & Gotanda, supra note 102, 183; see also United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d
1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991).
107
Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419 (quoting 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(3)).
108
See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the plain
meaning of ―responsible‖ as ―answerable‖ or ―involving a degree of accountability,‖ because the
CWA does not include a definition of ―responsible corporate officer‖).
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supports the inference that Congress intended to hold corporate officers
liable who were in a ―responsible position‖ and allow for the imputation
of knowledge to be based on their ―responsible position.‖
The RCO doctrine has also been frequently criticized for its
potential effect on any required mens rea element. There is a fear that
utilizing the doctrine will hold corporate officials, as a class of
defendants, strictly criminally liable and that this will have an unfair and
discriminatory effect.109 This criticism fails to acknowledge that the
application of the RCO doctrine does not eliminate the need to prove
culpability altogether. Rather, it is a tool by which the appropriate mens
rea can be imputed based on other circumstances.110 Liability is not
imposed under the RCO doctrine based solely on the officer‘s title;
rather, an evaluation must be done of the officer‘s responsibility in
relation to the criminal violation.111
IV. EARLY CASE APPLICATION OF THE RCO DOCTRINE
A.

UNITED STATES V. FREZZO BROS.

The first reported case to apply the RCO doctrine to a major federal
environmental statute was the Third Circuit‘s 1979 decision in United
States v. Frezzo Bros.112 The defendants, Guido and James Frezzo,
owned and operated a mushroom- farming business, Frezzo Brothers,
Inc., that was caught discharging pollutants in water of the United States
without a permit, in violation of the CWA.113 The indictment specifically
stated that the Frezzos were being charged as individuals in their
capacities as co-owners and corporate officers of Frezzo Brothers, Inc.114
The Frezzos argued on appeal that the district court erred by not
instructing the jury that the Frezzos were being charged in their capacity
as corporate owners and officers.115 The court of appeals dismissed this
109

Finn, supra note 63, at 573.
See Joseph E. Cole, Environmental Criminal Liability: What Federal Officials Know (or
Should Know) Can Hurt Them, 54 A.F. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (―[I]n no application of the RCO
doctrine to an environmental statute has the requirement for proving mens rea been done away with;
the requirement for knowledge of the underlying acts is still required and can be inferred as a result
of the corporate officer‘s position and authority.‖).
111
See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001).
112
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979).
113
Id. at 1125.
114
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp 266, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 1123
(3d Cir. 1979).
115
Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1130 n.11.
110
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argument summarily, noting that ―[t]he Government argued the case on
the ‗responsible corporate officer doctrine‘ recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Park and United States v.
Dotterweich,‖ and that the Court ―perceive[d] no error in the instruction
to the jury on this theory.‖116 This Third Circuit decision supports the
application of the RCO doctrine to the CWA as it is was applied to the
FDCA in Park and Dotterweich.
However, the issue on appeal was not how the criminal liability of
corporate officers had been defined at trial.117 The defendants contended
that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that they could
be found guilty as individuals when the government had argued the case
on the RCO doctrine and the indictment had charged them with acting as
corporate officials.118 The appellate court found no error in the
instruction to the jury on the ―responsible corporate officer doctrine‖ as
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Park119 and United States v. Dotterweich120 as argued by the
Government. Because this was not the issue on appeal the Court‘s
language regarding the correctness of the application of the RCO
doctrine was dictum.
B.

UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON & TOWERS, INC.

In 1984 the Third Circuit decided United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc.,121 which involved the criminal prosecution of a foreman
and a mid-level manager for a ―knowing‖ violation of Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting requirements.122 The
EPA had neither issued a permit nor received an application for a permit
for Johnson & Towers‘ operations.123 However, neither defendant was
actually in a position to secure the permit for the company on his own
authority.124
In discussing who may be found guilty under RCRA, the court first
reiterated the principle expressed in Dotterweich that ―though the result
may appear harsh, it is well established that criminal penalties attached to
116

Id.
Id. at 1124.
118
Id. at 1130 n.11.
119
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1974).
120
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
121
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
122
Id. at 663-64.
123
Id. at 664.
124
See id. at 666.
117
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regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast to
statutes based on common-law crimes, are to be construed to effectuate
the regulatory purpose.‖125 The court‘s decision supports the imposition
of harsh criminal liability based on the officer‘s position, justifying the
results on the importance of public safety.
The court addressed the fact that Dotterweich involved a strict
liability statute126 and that Johnson & Towers, Inc. dealt with a statute
containing a scienter requirement.127 The Court suggested that, because
of the public-welfare nature of RCRA, there might be a ―reasonable basis
for reading the statute without any mens rea requirement.‖128 But the
court also held that, because of the explicit knowledge requirement and
the syntax of the statute,129 the government would have to prove that the
defendants knew that Johnson & Towers, Inc., was required to have a
permit, and also knew that Johnson & Towers, Inc., did not have the
permit.130
The CWA and the CAA differ from RCRA in that they actually
have RCO liability written into them. This opinion appears to restrict the
imposition of criminal liability because the statute requires knowledge. It
is arguable that this opinion is not applicable to violations of the CAA or
CWA because this court was dealing with RCRA, which does not have
the RCO doctrine written into it.131 Further, the court indicated that a
reasonable basis existed for imposing crminal liability solely on the basis
of a corporate officer‘s position, but that it could not in this case due to
the wording of the statute.132
V.

CONTEMPORANEOUS COURT OPINIONS

There were three different cases decided in 1991 involving the RCO
doctrine. United States v. Brittain133 spoke to the expansion of criminal
liability under the RCO doctrine. On the other hand, both United States
v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.134 and United States v. White135

125

Id.
See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-392 (Westlaw 2010).
127
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (Westlaw 2010).
128
Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
129
See id.
130
Id. at 670.
131
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928 (Westlaw 2010).
132
See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
133
United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
134
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
135
United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
126
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went in the opposite direction, placing a limitation on the application of
the doctrine.
A.

UNITED STATES V. BRITTAIN

In United States v. Brittain,136 the defendant was charged with two
misdemeanor counts under the CWA for unlawful discharges into
navigable waters.137 The CWA expressly includes RCOs in its definition
of persons who can be convicted under the Act.138 Brittain was the public
utilities director for the city of Enid, Oklahoma, and ―had general
supervisory authority over the operation of the [city‘s] wastewater
treatment plant.‖139 The evidence showed that Brittain was advised that
pollutants were being discharged into a local creek in violation of the
city‘s permit.140 Brittain had observed the discharges but instructed the
plant supervisor not to report them to the EPA, even though it was
required by the permit.141
Brittain raised a statutory-construction argument on appeal that
addressed the CWA‘s definition of the terms ―individual‖ and
―responsible corporate officer.‖142 Brittain contended that there was no
evidence that he individually caused the unlawful discharge, and the only
proof of his involvement with the discharge was his relationship to the
discharging entity, Enid.143 Therefore, he argued, he could not be
convicted as an ―individual‖ under the Act. Brittain argued that for
criminal liability to attach to an individual who is related to the
discharging entity but is not the actual discharger, the government must
establish that the individual was an RCO.144
The court rejected this argument, holding that the inclusion of the
term ―responsible corporate officer‖ in the CWA did not narrow the
range of individuals subject to criminal liability.145 The court discussed
the origin of the term in Dotterweich and Park, likening the purposes of
the CWA to that of the FDCA and explaining that ―Congress perceived

136

931 F.2d 1413.
Id. at 1414 (10th Cir. 1991) (Brittain was also charged with making false statements under
18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1988)); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (Westlaw 2010).
138
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010) (definition of ―person‖).
139
Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1415.
140
Id. at 1418.
141
See id. at 1420.
142
See id. at 1419.
143
See id. at 1420.
144
See id. at 1419.
145
Id.
137
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the public health interest to outweigh the hardship suffered by criminally
liable responsible corporate officers who had no consciousness of wrongdoing.‖146 Concluding that the same public health rationale applies to the
CWA, the court went on to state:
We think that Congress perceived this objective [to restore and
maintain the integrity of the nation‘s waters] to outweigh hardships
suffered by ―responsible corporate officers‖ who are held criminally
liable in spite of their lack of ―consciousness of wrong-doing.‖ We
interpret the addition of ―responsible corporate officers‖ as an
expansion of liability under the Act. . . Under this interpretation a
―responsible corporate officer,‖ to be held criminally liable, would not
have to ―willfully or negligently‖ cause a permit violation. Instead, the
willfulness or negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by
147
virtue of his position of responsibility.

Unfortunately, the defendant‘s criminal intent was not an issue on
appeal.148 For this reason, the court‘s language regarding imposing
criminal liability on RCOs has been dismissed as dictum.149
Nevertheless, it does indicate how the court would decide the issue if it
were to come before it.
B.

UNITED STATES V. MACDONALD & WATSON

The First Circuit chose to limit criminal liability in United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.150 The First Circuit overturned the
felony conviction of the company president, ruling that the trial court‘s
jury instructions improperly suggested that the president could be
convicted of a knowing RCRA violation based upon his position as an
RCO and without actual proof of actual knowledge.151 The jury had been
instructed that knowledge could be proven either by a showing of actual
knowledge or by a showing that the defendant was an RCO.152 The trial
court stated that a defendant is an RCO if the defendant (1) was a
corporate officer, (2) had the responsibility to supervise the allegedly
illegal activities, and (3) knew or believed that illegal activity of the type
146

Id.
Id.
148
See id. at 1413.
149
See Finn, supra note 63, at 565-66 (―On close analysis, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit‘s
―expansive language in Brittain‖ is ―unwarranted dicta.‖).
150
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
151
Id. at 50-51.
152
Id.
147
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alleged occurred.153
The First Circuit ruled that this test was inconsistent with the
express mens rea requirement in RCRA.154 The First Circuit agreed that
knowledge may be inferred from willful blindness or circumstantial
evidence, including a defendant‘s position, responsibility, conduct, and
information provided to the defendant on prior occasions.155 However,
the court held that it was improper to allow a conclusive presumption of
knowledge based on such evidence when the crime expressly requires
proof of knowledge as an element.156 Accordingly, the court concluded
that ―[i]n a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere
showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an
adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge.‖157
Again it should be noted that the CWA and the CAA differ from
RCRA in that they actually have RCO liability written into them. It is
arguable that this opinion is inapplicable to CAA or CWA violations
because this court was dealing with RCRA, which does not have the
RCO doctrine written into it.158
C.

UNITED STATES V. WHITE

The same limitation is further supported under RCRA violations by
the decision in United States v. White,159 in which the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington clearly rejected the
proposition that a corporate officer may be held criminally liable for
RCRA violations based solely on the officer‘s responsible position.160 In
White, the prosecution relied on Park and Dotterweich to argue that the
company‘s environmental safety officer could be held liable for knowing
criminal violations of RCRA simply by virtue of his position of
responsibility and authority.161 The court disagreed, holding that those
cases were inapplicable because they involved strict-liability crimes,
whereas the criminal provision of RCRA contains a mens rea element of
knowledge.162 The RCO doctrine, the court ruled, does not apply to

153

Id. at 50, 52 n.15.
Id. at 53.
155
Id. at 52, 54.
156
Id. at 52.
157
Id. at 55.
158
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928 (Westlaw 2010).
159
United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
160
See id. at 895.
161
Id. at 894.
162
Id. at 894-95.
154
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crimes where the applicable statute requires proof of knowledge as an
element of the crime.163 The court concluded that to secure a conviction,
the government must prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of
the violations, rather than merely showing that the defendant should have
known of the violations.164
VI. CONFIRMATIONS OF RCO-DOCTRINE LIMITATIONS
Although the limitations set forth on the RCO doctrine set forth in
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.165 and United
States v. White166 were in the context of RCRA, the reasoning was
extended to apply under the CWA and the CAA in later cases.
A.

UNITED STATES V. IVERSON

In United States v. Iverson,167 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a limited
application of the RCO doctrine to Thomas Iverson, the president of a
company who both encouraged and allowed his employees to discharge
water containing chemical residue into the sewer.168 The district court‘s
jury instruction on the RCO doctrine required that to convict, the jury
had to find that (1) the defendant had knowledge of the fact that
pollutants were being discharged to the sewer system by employees of
the company, (2) the defendant had the authority and capacity to prevent
the discharge of pollutants to the sewer system, and (3) the defendant
failed to prevent the on-going discharge of pollutants into the sewer
system.169 On appeal, Iverson argued that these instructions erroneously
allowed the jury to find him guilty of CWA violations without finding
that he was actually in control of the activity that caused the discharge, or
that he had an express corporate duty to oversee the activity, and without
finding that the discharges violated the CWA.170 The Ninth Circuit
rejected these arguments and upheld the use of the RCO doctrine.171
163

Id. at 895.
Id.
165
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
166
United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
167
United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).
168
Id. at 1018-19.
169
Id. at 1022.
170
Id. (holding that a ―responsible corporate officer‖ did not have to participate or control her
employees‘ actions to be held liable, but that liability hinged only on ―authority to exercise control‖
over the activity in question). But see U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 70-72 (1998) (holding that an
―operator‖ must participate in and control its subsidiaries‘ activities to be liable).
171
See Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1026.
164
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However, the court noted that the doctrine ―relieve[s] the government
only of having to prove that defendant personally discharged or caused
the discharge of a pollutant. The government still had to prove that the
discharges violated the law and that defendant knew that the discharges
were pollutants.‖172 This affirms the limitations that were set forth in
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.173 and United
States v. White.174 The courts chose to restrict criminal liability by
requiring actual knowledge in the CWA context instead of allowing for
the use of the RCO doctrine to close the gap between the reality of
corporate officers‘ knowledge of the violation and the difficulty in
proving that knowledge.
B.

UNITED STATES V. MING HONG

United States v. Ming Hong175 was a CWA prosecution for permit
violations. James Ming Hong was the owner of Avion Environmental
Groups, a wastewater treatment facility in Richmond, Virginia.176 Hong
was charged with negligently violating pretreatment requirements ―as a
responsible corporate officer.‖177 Hong argued that he could not be
prosecuted as a responsible corporate an RCO because he was not a
formally designated corporate officer of Avion and, alternatively, that he
did not exert sufficient control over Avion‘s operations to be held
responsible for the discharges from Avion‘s facility.178 The Fourth
Circuit rejected both arguments.179 It began by reviewing Dotterweich,
which it summarized as ―holding that all who had ‗a responsible share‘ in
the criminal conduct could be held accountable for corporate violations
of the law.‖180 The court also noted that Park ―elaborat[ed] on the
concept of a ‗responsible share,‘‖ holding that a defendant may be held
criminally responsible for a violation he did not directly commit if ―the
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility
and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to
correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so.‖181 The

172

Id.
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
174
United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
175
United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001).
176
Id. at 529-30.
177
Id. at 531.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 529.
180
Id. at 531.
181
Id. (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975)); see also Lisa, supra note
173
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court described the criminal liability to be applied under the RCO
doctrine as:
The gravamen of liability as a responsible corporate officer is not
one‘s corporate title or lack thereof; rather, the pertinent question is
whether the defendant bore such a relationship to the corporation that
it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for failing to prevent the
182
charged violations of the CWA.

This reasoning appears to leave the door open to an extension of
liability based on corporate position. Unfortunately, this application of
the RCO doctrine is limited, because James Ming Hong was held
criminally liable under CWA § 309(c)(1)(A) for negligent discharges by
his company, not for knowing violations.183
C.

UNITED STATES V. HANSEN

In United States v. Hansen,184 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
convictions of three individuals convicted of conspiracy and violating the
CWA, RCRA, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The district court used an
RCO instruction requiring that, to convict, the jury had to find that the
defendants ―acted knowingly in failing to prevent, detect or correct the
violation.‖185 The defendants argued that the instruction allowed the jury
to find them guilty based on constructive, rather than actual,
knowledge.186 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding that
the requirement that the defendants must have ―acted knowingly‖ made it
sufficiently clear that the jury could not find the defendants guilty under
the RCO doctrine without finding that they had actual knowledge of the
violations.187 This holding again reaffirmed the mens rea limitation set by
previous courts.

104, at 9.
182

Ming Hong, 242 F.3d at 531.
Id. at 532.
184
United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001).
185
Id. at 1252.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1253.
183
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VII. JUSTIFICATION FOR EXPANDING LIABILITY
A.

THE NEED FOR THE EXPANSION OF LIABILITY

The RCO doctrine is a necessary tool to close the gap between the
reality of corporate officer involvement in the violation of environmental
crimes and prosecutors‘ ability to convict corporate officers for their
involvement.188 A corporation may be convicted for crimes of its agents
who violate the law while acting on its behalf and in the scope of their
employment,189 but a corporate officer is generally not criminally liable
unless he or she personally participates in or authorizes the criminal
act.190 Generally, an officer cannot be convicted for acts performed by
other employees unless it is proven that the actions were done under the
officer‘s direction or with his or her permission.191 This is what makes
the use of the RCO doctrine so important, especially in the prosecution

188

See John Monroe, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer and Conscious Avoidance
Doctrines in the Context of the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1367, 1383 (2006)
(arguing that the RCO doctrine and the conscious-avoidance doctrines provide an analytical
framework for the prosecution of parties who are not directly involved in a criminal act); see also
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 255
(6th ed. 1998).
189
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909) (in
considering the criminal responsibility of a corporation for an act done while an authorized agent of
the company was exercising the authority conferred upon him, the Court found that in applying the
principle governing civil liability, ―we go only a step farther in holding that the act of the agent,
while exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled,
in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the
corporation for which he is acting in the premises‖).
190
See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON‘S CRIMINAL LAW § 29, at 181 (15th ed. 1993) (―In
connection with the principal in the second degree or accessory before the fact, the terms ‗aid‘ and
‗abet‘ are frequently used interchangeably, although they are not synonymous. To ‗aid‘ is to assist or
help another. To ‗abet‘ means, literally, to bait or excite, as in the case of an animal. In its legal
sense, it means to encourage, advise, or instigate the commission of a crime.‖).
191
See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 689, 702-08 (1930) (concluding that courts hold a principal criminally liable for acts that he or
she ―causes‖ his or her agent to perform, either by express encouragement or knowing
acquiescence); see also 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1349 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999); see, e.g., United States v.
Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 190-93 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability of corporate
officer who knew that others were making false statements to a government agency, because the
officer did not affirmatively encourage the making of those statements); United States v. Berger, 456
F.2d 1349, 1352 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming aiding and abetting liability of president and chief
executive officer whose ―willful affirmative acts‖ included directing a bookkeeper to remove
invoices of a foreign subsidiary as part of a tax-evasion scheme); United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d
871, 872 (D.C. 1951) (noting that the general rule requires that officers must personally authorize a
criminal act to be held liable).
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of environmental crimes; it can bridge the gap between the current law
and what is needed to hold the appropriate actors responsible for
corporate environmental crimes.192
It is important to note that the RCO doctrine is a common-law
theory of imposing liability that is separate and distinct from piercing the
corporate veil or personal liability for direct participation in tortious
conduct.193 Unlike when liability is based on piercing the corporate veil,
liability as an RCO does not depend on a finding of that the corporation
is inadequately capitalized, that the corporate form is being used to
perpetrate a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been honored.194
The RCO doctrine requires a finding of three essential elements in order
to convict a corporate officer:
(1) [T]he individual must be in a position of responsibility which
allows the person to influence corporate policies or activities; (2) there
must be a nexus between the individual‘s position and the violation in
question such that the individual could have influenced the corporate
actions which constituted the violations; and (3) the individual‘s
195
actions or inactions facilitated the violations.

These requirements prevent arbitrary imposition of criminal liability
based only on corporate title.196
Use of the RCO doctrine to infer knowledge in the context of
corporate environmental crimes is necessary to convict those officers
who are responsible. It is extraordinarily difficult to prove that a

192
See Todd W. Grant, The Responsible Relationship Doctrine of United States v. Park: A
Tool for Prosecution of Corporate Officers Under Federal and State Environmental Laws, 11 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 203, 204 (1992) (discussing the difficulty in obtaining a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence when there is only indirect evidence of a corporate officer‘s guilt from the
―bad act‖ of his or her subordinates who may work far down in the corporation‘s bureaucratic
hierarchy).
193
See Noel Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 288 (2002) (noting that the doctrine does not require the government to
pierce the corporate veil); see also Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937, 963-64
(Conn. 2005); BEC Corp. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 775 A.2d 928, 938 (Conn. 2001).
194
See, e.g., Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 487-88 (1991) (―[W]e conclude that it was
unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil in order to find that the [corporate officers] were personally
liable for their misrepresentations.‖); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009); 18 AM.
JUR. 2D Corporations § 54 (2009).
195
In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975), and United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)); see also
Comm‘r Ind. Dep‘t of Envtl. Mgmt v. RLG, Inc.. 755 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 2001).
196
See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975).
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corporate officer actually authorized the criminal act of a lower-level
employee, because authorization of that sort is rarely documented.197
Higher-up corporate officers in positions of control can easily create the
impression that they do not know the details of lower-level employees‘
illegal activity.198 In fact, because many statutes explicitly require proof
of an affirmative illegal act to secure the conviction an officer, the law
actually encourages concealment.199
B.

INFERRING CRIMINAL KNOWLEDGE WITH THE RCO DOCTRINE

Application of the RCO doctrine to expand criminal liability would
be consistent with congressional intent because Congress specifically left
the definition of ―knowingly‖ to the courts.200 By not providing any
definition, Congress gave the courts authorization to consider doctrinal
interpretations, such as the RCO doctrine, in their analysis.201 By not
defining ―knowingly,‖ Congress left the definition open to be interpreted
according to modern jurisprudence. For example, the jury instruction
regarding the term ―knowingly‖ varies from circuit to circuit. The Fifth
Circuit‘s pattern instruction states that ―knowingly . . . means that the act
was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or
accident.‖202 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit defines ―knowing‖ in this way:
An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does
not act (or fail to act) through ignorance, mistake or accident. The
government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that
his/her acts or omissions were unlawful. You may consider the
197
See RONALD R. SIMS & MARGARET P. SPENCER, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT: AN OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION, IN CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: THE LEGAL,
SOCIETAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 1, 11-12 (Ronald R. Sims & Margaret P. Spencer eds., 1995)
(noting that senior officers can easily disguise misconduct in a large organization, as in one case in
which officers instituted compliance policies in order to conceal their approval of misconduct).
198
See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that
an officer who exercises complete control over corporate operations may avoid confronting the
details of illegal toxic waste disposal, making it difficult to impose liability).
199
See, e.g., People v. Byrne, 570 N.E.2d 1066, 1068-69 (N.Y. 1991) (construing N.Y. Penal
Law to limit individual liability for corporate criminal acts to defendants who caused to be
performed or personally performed illegal conduct).
200
See United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986) (―Congress
did not provide any guidance, either in the statute or the legislative history, concerning the meaning
of ‗knowing‘ in section 6928(d).‖).
201
Heep, supra note 8 at 723 (arguing that continued application of the RCO doctrine is
consistent with congressional intent because Congress specifically left the definition of ―knowingly‖
to the courts).
202
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 1ST CIR. 2.13
(1998).
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evidence of the defendant‘s words, acts, or omissions, along with all
the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant acted
203
knowingly.

On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit provides no pattern instruction
because it has determined that ―the meaning of the term ‗knowingly‘
varies depending on the particular statute in which it appears.‖204 The
Eighth Circuit provides no model instruction, because ―in most cases the
word ‗knowingly‘ does not need to be defined.‖205 The courts would
clearly be acting within appropriate boundaries by allowing the
―knowledge‖ requirement to be met inferentially in environmental crimes
through the RCO doctrine.
The inference of knowledge has been applied under several
different legal doctrines. Knowledge has been found in situations where
only circumstantial evidence was provided.206 This can also be seen in
other legal doctrines such as respondeat superior, or vicarious liability,
which allows proof of a defendant‘s criminal knowledge to be substituted
by proof of someone else‘s knowledge.207 The courts have also imposed
liability under the doctrines of willful blindness or conscious avoidance
of the truth.208 This allows for the inference of knowledge based on what
the defendant would have known through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.209 Lastly, an argument can be made for the imposition of
liability based on an officer‘s fiduciary duty to his or her company.210

203

FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS , MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9TH CIR. 5.6

(2003).
204

FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 6TH CIR. 2.06

(2008).
205

FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS, MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 8TH CIR. 7.03
(2007) (citing United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir. 1980)).
206
See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (―[T]he
government may prove guilty knowledge with circumstantial evidence.‖) In the Hayes case, the
statute at issue established certain procedures that, when not followed, permitted a jury to infer
certain wrongdoing. Id.
207
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, respondeat superior (8th ed. 2004) (―The doctrine holding
an employer or principal liable for the employee‘s or agent‘s wrongful acts committed within the
scope of the employment or agency.‖).
208
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, willful blindness (8th ed. 2004) (―Deliberate avoidance of
knowledge of a crime, esp. by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing
despite being aware that it is highly probable. A person acts with willful blindness, for example, by
deliberately refusing to look inside an unmarked package after being paid by a known drug dealer to
deliver it. Willful blindness creates an inference of knowledge of the crime in question.‖).
209
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), willful blindness (8th ed. 2004).
210
See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 official cmt. (1983) (setting forth the
standards of conduct for directors by focusing on the manner in which directors perform their
duties).
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Based on all these well-settled theories of law, it is not outside the
courts‘ authority to expand liability by use of the RCO doctrine.
i.

Circumstantial Proof of Knowledge

The use of circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge is seen in
United States v. Hayes International Corp.211 The defendants in this case,
a corporation and one of its employees, were charged with knowingly
transporting hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility.212 The
government proved, through a series of circumstances, the defendants‘
knowledge that the facility to which they had shipped certain paint waste
was not recycling the waste.213 The court pointed out that the government
presented no direct proof of the employee‘s knowledge that paint waste
was not being recycled, but that it successfully proved such knowledge
through the series of circumstances.214
Congressional intent to allow the use of circumstantial evidence to
impose criminal liability upon persons can be seen in the enforcement
provisions of both the CWA and CAA. They both explicitly provide that
knowledge may be established by the use of circumstantial evidence.215
Again, this indicates that the inference of knowledge via circumstantial
evidence under the RCO doctrine would not stray from congressional
intent.
ii.

Other Ways To Prove “Knowledge”

Along the same lines as circumstantial proof of knowledge, other
criminal-law doctrines have been used to prove knowledge in
environmental jurisprudence.216 These doctrines allow for proof of actual
211

United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
See id. at 1501.
213
See id. at 1506. The evidence revealed that the employee knew the recycler derived no
economic benefit from accepting the paint waste, and that the employee failed to follow internal
corporate procedures requiring disposal of wastes lacking resale value only to sites approved by the
EPA. Additionally, conversations between the employee and the recycler indicated that the
employee knew that the paint wastes were not being recycled. Id.
214
See id.; see also supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
215
See CWA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i) (Westlaw 2010) (providing that ―in proving the
defendant‘s possession of actual knowledge [under the knowing endangerment provision]
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to
shield himself from relevant information‖); see also CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(B) (Westlaw
2010) (noting providing that ―in proving a defendant‘s possession of actual knowledge,
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to
be shielded from relevant information.‖).
216
See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987)
212
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knowledge to be based on proof of something other than actual
knowledge.217 Respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, is essential in
the area of corporate prosecutions because the doctrine allows proof of
the defendant‘s criminal knowledge to be made by proof of someone
else‘s knowledge.218 At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court
extended the respondeat superior doctrine ―a step farther‖ to include its
applicability in the criminal context.219 ―The rationale for extending
principles of respondeat superior to criminal prosecutions is grounded in
the belief that a broad standard is needed . . . to combat the
organizational roots of white collar crime.‖220
The doctrine of willful blindness, or and conscious avoidance of the
truth, has been used to prove criminal knowledge as well.221 The doctrine
is based on the theory that ―deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge
are equally culpable.‖222 The theory encompasses the idea that a person
―knows of facts of which he is less than absolutely certain‖ when that
person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such facts.223
The doctrine allows the trier of fact to infer guilty knowledge, such as in
United States v. Hayes International Corp.,224 where the court stated that
a defendant acts ―knowingly‖ under RCRA, even if the defendant only
willfully fails to determine the permit status of a facility where hazardous

(upholding the conviction of a bank over violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act based
on a ―pattern of illegal activity,‖ which established an illicit ―scheme.‖).
217
See id.
218
See United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 97 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
corporate defendant criminally liable for actions of its senior vice-president, who had caused a
protected federal wetlands to be dredged and filled without a permit); see also Joseph G. Block &
Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine—Can You Go to Jail for What You
Don’t Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347, 1366-67 (1992) (arguing that substitutional doctrines, such as
willful blindness and respondeat superior, create the danger that the requisite knowledge requirement
will be read out of the environmental statutes).
219
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909)
(―Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act of
the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him . . . may be controlled, in the interest of
public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for
which he is acting in the premises.‖); see also United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D. N.Y.
1918) (Learned Hand, J.) (―[T]there is no distinction in essence between the civil and the criminal
liability of corporations, based upon the element of intent or wrongful purpose. Each is merely an
imputation to the corporation of the mental condition of its agents.‖).
220
Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (1990).
221
Stefan A. Noe, “Willful Blindness”: A Better Doctrine for Holding Corporate Officers
Criminally Responsible for RCRA Violations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1461, 1469 (1993).
222
Id. (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976).
223
Id. (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976).
224
United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
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waste is being shipped.225
iii. An Affirmative Duty To Act
In some situations, the courts have permitted criminal knowledge to
be established based on what the defendant would have known through
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Generally, this is applied if the
defendant has some affirmative duty to know the facts or to investigate
the situation.226 This theory could be used to support imposing liability
under the RCO doctrine based on the affirmative duty that an officer
owes to his or her company.
A corporate officer has a fiduciary duty to the company that
includes the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.227 The duty of care can
be used to impose liability because it establishes standards by which an
officer is expected to act.228 The duty of care requires officers to maintain
adequate oversight of corporate operations and to obtain adequate and
reliable information before making decisions.229 This duty requires an
officer to take an active role in monitoring the corporation‘s activities.230
Additionally, the courts have found that officers are under a continuing
obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation and

225

See id. at 1504 (―[I]n this regulatory context a defendant acts knowingly if he willfully
fails to determine the permit status of the facility.‖ (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342
U.S. 337 (1952)).
226
See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (allowing inference of
criminal knowledge based on the defendant‘s failure to exercise reasonable diligence). The
defendants in Dee were civilian engineers involved in the development of chemical warfare systems
at the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground in
Maryland. Id. at 743. They were convicted of illegally storing, treating, and disposing of hazardous
wastes and appealed the convictions on several grounds. Id. The court found that knowledge could
be inferred with respect to one of the defendants from evidence that he was informed by safety
inspectors and employees of problems with the stored chemicals. Id. at 745. The defendant did not
respond but merely told the staff to ―clean it up as best they could.‖ Id. The court also found that
knowledge could be inferred from evidence that the defendant was in charge of operations at the
plant, had previously taken action with respect to the storage of the chemicals, repeatedly ignored
warnings, and took no actions to comply with the RCRA. Id.
227
See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 official cmt. (1983).
228
See id. (setting forth the standards of conduct for officers by focusing on the manner in
which officers perform their duties); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (discussing fiduciary duties of
corporate officers).
229
See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822-24 (N.J. 1981) (stating that a
corporate officer should acquire at least a basic understanding of business of corporation and
accordingly and that officers are bound to exercise ordinary care so they cannot set up as a defense
lack of knowledge needed to exercise the requisite degree of care).
230
See id. (listing several steps that a reasonably prudent officer should take in order to
maintain proper oversight over a corporation‘s affairs).
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are bound to exercise ordinary care.231
As discussed above, a corporate officer is subject to criminal
liability if he or she actively participated in or directed illegal conduct.232
It can be argued that an officer who violates his or her duty of oversight
by allowing the corporation to break the law should also be held liable,
even if the officer was not the person who actually participated.233 In the
corporate structure, as discussed above, the corporate officer has a duty
of oversight.234 Logically, the omission or failure to comply with this
duty of oversight could lead to criminal liability as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Protection of the environment is essential to our continued
existence. Based on modern corporations‘ size and ability to impact the
environment, it is in the corporate context that the prosecution of
environmental crimes is so important. The courts should expand criminal
liability based on the RCO doctrine instead of limiting its application.
Prevention is the key to the effectiveness of environmental laws, and this
would best be met by the application of the RCO doctrine to expand
criminal liability. As the need for environmental awareness becomes
greater every day, we have to pay attention to the impact we are having
on the environment. As time passes we are slowly losing our opportunity
to prevent further deterioration. This is why it is essential to extend
criminal sanctions to corporate officers, the actual actors, instead of
stopping at the front door of the corporation.
Nancy Mullikin

231
See id. (―Directorial management does not require a detailed inspection of day-to-day
activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies. Accordingly, a director is
well advised to attend board meetings regularly.‖).
232
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 649 (June 2009). (―A corporate official or agent is personally
liable for all criminal acts in which he or she participates, regardless of whether he or she is acting
on his or her own behalf or on behalf of the corporation.‖).
233
See Note, Fiduciary Duties: Expanding the Use of the RCO Doctrine to Statutes with a
Scienter Requirement, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 235, 248 (2001) (arguing that extending strict
liability to corporate directors and officers in the area of environmental statutes is appropriate based
on directors‘ and officers‘ duty to the corporation).
234
See United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d at 822 (discussing duties of a director, including
―general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies,‖ regular attendance at board meetings, and
―familiarity with corporation‘s financial status‖).
Golden Gate University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010.
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